US Marine Corps Combined Action Program in South Vietnam Article

US Marine Corps Combined Action Program in South Vietnam - Article Example From this paper it is clear that  the configuration of a village defense platoon is arrived upon combining a Marine squad with indigenous forces.This proved very effective in thwarting enemy forces security at the village level. CAP, which was first implemented during operations in South Vietnam, has withstood the test of time. Although there is no comprehensive statistical evidence to prove its effectiveness, first hand observations of military officers and subjective evaluations have assented to its utility. The successes met by American troops in later wars in regions such as Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, etc, underscore CAP-style organization’s relevance and usefulness.This study outlines that  the CAP was a natural extension of the martial traditions that the US Marines excelled in. The US Marines have long understood how pacification of locals and subsequent co-option to their cause drastically improves chances of success. A robust training program for the local recruits a nd provisions for their security greatly helped with administration of localities. The validity of the CAP concept is attested by its successful implementation in war experiences in Haiti, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, etc during the last two centuries. CAP-style organization is especially applicable in regions where the opposition employs guerrilla warfare tactics.   In this sense, the CAP concept can be construed as counter-guerrilla warfare.... The CAP organized the hamlet defense and lived in the hamlet on a 24-hour basis. Besides hamlet security, â€Å"CAP teams provided the villagers medical care and assistance with hygiene and disease related problems. CAP teams also built simple structures and roads and conducted a variety of other civic projects aimed at helping the people. The Marine pacification program was successful in screening the people from the VC and in large part insulating them from some of the corruption and abuses of the GVN.† (Clark, 1990, p. 115) One of the early demonstrations of CAP’s organization and operation was witnessed in August of 1965 in the Vietnam theatre. The unit assembled from 3rd Battalion of 4th Marines is a case in point. Led by Lt. Col. William W. Taylor in the Phu Bai area, the unit’s Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) covered half a dozen villages plus an airfield. Under pressure from enemy retaliation and realizing how thinly spread his personnel are across the terrain, the Colonel’s executive officer forwarded a plan to include members of the local militia into the 3/4 unit’s operations. After going up the ranks for evaluation and approval, the suggestion was finally assented by major General Lew Walt and Lieutenant General Victor Krulak. They foresaw how this concept could prove to be a force multiplier. It was upon their approval that General Nguyen Van Chuan of the local militia (Army of the Republic of Vietnam - ARVN) agreed to the co-operative arrangement. General Chuan gave General Walt control of local platoons in the Phu Bai jurisdiction. The results of the Phu Bai experiment encouraged further trials. The Marines instilled a combative, offensive spirit in their counterparts and gave the militia a